Abstract. We consider propositional modal logic with two modal operators and [ =]. In topological semantics is interpreted as an interior operator and [ =] as difference. We show that some important topological properties are expressible in this language. In addition, we present a few logics and proofs of f.m.p. and of completeness theorems.
topological spaces (Theorem 6.6), S4DS is complete with respect to all dense-initself topological spaces (Theorem 6.8), and S4DT 1 S is complete with respect to any zero-dimensional dense-in-itself metric space (Theorem 6.11).
Definitions and basic notions.
Let us introduce some notations the reader will meet in this paper. Assume that B is a set, R, R ′ ⊆ B × B are relations on B, then
In this paper, we study propositional modal logics with two modal operators, and [ =] . A formula is defined as follows:
The standard classic logic operators (∨, Let L be a logic and let Γ be a set of formulas, then L + Γ denotes the minimal logic containing L and Γ. If Γ = {A}, then we write L + A rather then L + {A} .
In this paper, however, we consider a few additional axioms:
The first two axioms are for [ =] and they are from the paper by de Rijke [14] . These axioms correspond to some basic properties of inequality: symmetry and pseudo-transitivity 1 respectively. The next two axioms are axioms for S4. These axioms have well-known correspondence to the properties of topological interior operator: IY ⊆ Y and IY ⊆ IIY 1 In this paper relation R is pseudo-transitive iff R + is transitive. In some papers this property calls weakly transitive (cf. [6, 3]) respectively (where Y is an arbitrary set). We denote the interior and the closure operators by I and C respectively. Axiom (D ) is needed to connect and [ =] and to make sure that [∀] is the universal modality.
The meaning of the next two axioms will be explained later.
In this paper we study the following three logics:
3. Topological models.
Let us define topological models. Definition 3.1. A topological model is a pair (X, θ), where X is a topological space and θ is a function assigning to each proposition letter p a subset θ(p) of X. The function θ is called a valuation.
Definition 3.2. The truth of a formula at a point of a topological model is defined by induction:
If U is a subset of X, then X, θ, U |= A denotes that X, θ, x |= A for any x ∈ U . A formula A is called valid in a topological space X (notation: X |= A), if it is true at any point under any valuation. Also in notation X, θ, x |= A we will omit the space and/or the valuation, if it is clear what space and/or valuation we consider.
is the set of all formulas that are valid in all topological spaces from T .
Let us describe the classes of topological spaces axiomatized by (AT 1 ), (DS). Definition 3.4. A T 1 -space is a topological space such that all its one-element subsets are closed.
As we mentioned in introduction there is an axiom that defines T 1 spaces in [9] , but it has a little bit different form. And due to the next lemma they are equivalent on topological spaces. Lemma 3.5. Let X be a topological space then X |= AT 1 iff X is a T 1 -space.
Proof. (⇒) Ad absurdum. Suppose there exists x ∈ X such that {x} is not closed. Hence X − {x} = I(X − {x}). Let U = X − {x}. There exists
Since y = x, we have y |= p, which means that y together with some its neighborhood is in U . This contradicts to (3.1).
(⇐) Assume that X is a T 1 -space. Let X, θ, x |= [ =]p then θ(p) ⊇ X − {x}. We need to prove that x |= [ =] p. It means that for all y ∈ X − {x} y |= p. Take any y ∈ X − {x}. Since X − {x} is open, there exists an open U ∋ y and U ⊆ X − {x}.
Definition 3.6. Let X be a topological space. A point x ∈ X is called isolated, if {x} is open. X is called dense-in-itself, if it has no isolated points.
Lemma 3.7. Let X be a topological space then X |= DS iff X is dense-in-itself.
Proof. (⇒) Ad absurdum. Assume that X is not dense-in-itself and x ∈ X is isolated.
Let us take a valuation θ in X such that θ(p) = X − {x}; then
Since {x} is open and x |= ¬p, it follows that x |= ¬p or equivalently, x |= ¬♦p. This contradicts to the axiom (DS).
(⇐) Assume that X is dense-in-itself and (X, θ), x |= [ =]p; then there are two cases:
Kripke frames and models.
Kripke frames and models are well-known basic notions of modal logic (cf. [4] and [5] ). In this paper however, we consider Kripke frames with one or two relations only. The first is denoted as R and the second (if it is present) -as R D .
Definition 4.2.
A Kripke model is a pair M = (F, θ), where F is a frame and θ is a valuation (a function from the set of all proposition letters to the set of all subsets of W ).
M, x |= A denotes that formula A is true in model M at point x; M |= A denotes that A is true at all points of model M; F |= A denotes that (F, θ), x |= A for all valuations θ and all points x ∈ W ; F, x |= A denotes that (F, θ), x |= A for all valuations θ. For a subset U ⊆ W M, U |= A denotes that for any x ∈ U (M, x |= A). In notation:
Definition 4.6. By cone F x we will understand the frame
where
The following two lemmas are well-known (cf. [4] and [5] ).
In this paper we consider only S4D-frames. The axioms B D , 4 − D , D , T , 4 put constraints on relations R and R D . So from now on we assume that all Kripke frames satisfy the following conditions:
• R is reflexive (axiom T ) and transitive (4 ),
Note that we can further assume that R D ∪ Id = W × W , because according to Lemma 4.7 we can consider only generated subframes. Now let us see what formulas AT 1 and DS mean in a Kripke frame.
denotes the topological space on the set W with the topology {R(V ) | V ⊆ W }. For formulas with the difference modality the validity in F and T op(F ) may not be equivalent.This is because R D could be not the real inequality relation. Definition 4.9. Let R be a transitive reflexive relation on W . Then x ∈ W is called R-minimal (respectively R-maximal), if for any y, yRx (respectively xRy) implies x = y. Definition 4.10. Let F = (W, R, R D ) be an S4D-frame; we say that F is a T 1 -frame (or has the T 1 -property), if all R D -irreflexive points are R-minimal.
Proof. (⇒) Suppose F |= AT 1 and there exists an R-non-minimal and R D -irreflexive point in F . To be more specific, let x and y be two different points such that ¬xR D x and yRx. Take a valuation θ such that θ(p) = W − {x}. Then x |= [ =]p and x |= ¬p, thus y |= ♦¬p. Since x = y and yRx, we have xR D y, x |= = ♦¬p.
(⇐) Assume that F is a T 1 -frame and for some valuation for F we have x |= [ =]p. Let us show that x |= [ =] p. As we mentioned above, generated subframes preserve validity, so we can assume that F = F x hence R D (x) ∪ {x} = W . There are two possibilities:
1) xR D x. Then y |= p for any y ∈ W , hence for all y ∈ W we have y |= p; so
2) ¬xR D x. Then y |= p for every y = x. By assumption, y = x, yRz implies z = x, hence z |= p. So for any y = x y |= p; hence x |= [ =] p. Definition 4.12. Let F = (W, R, R D ) be an S4D-frame; we say that F is a DS-frame, if every R D -irreflexive point has an R-successor (called just a successor further on).
Proof. (⇒) Suppose F |= DS and there exists an R D -irreflexive point x without successors. We take a valuation θ such that θ(p) = W − {x}; then x |= [ =]p but x |= ♦p. This contradicts F |= DS.
(⇐) Suppose that every R D -irreflexive point in F has a successor. Let us prove that for any x ∈ W x |= DS. Suppose (F, θ), x |= [ =]p, then there are two cases: (i) x is R D -reflexive; then θ(p) = W , and so x |= ♦p since R is reflexive; (ii) x is R D -irreflexive, then θ(p) ⊇ W − {x}, and by our assumption, there exists y = x such that xRy; hence y |= p and x |= ♦p.
5.
Kripke completeness and finite model property.
All our axioms are Sahlqvist formulas. So we easily obtain Kripke completeness for logics S4D, S4DS, S4DT 1 S.
Following the common way of proving f.m.p. we use filtration (cf. [5] and [4] ).
Definition 5.1. Let M = (F, θ) be a Kripke model, where F = (W, R, R D ) is a Kripke frame and Ψ is a set of formulas closed under subformulas. Let ≈ Ψ be the equivalence relation on the elements of W defined as follows:
By [w] we denote the equivalence class of w. 
Lemma 5.3. Let F 1 be an S4D-frame, M 1 = (F 1 , θ 1 ) a model, Ψ a finite set of formulas closed under subformulas. Then there exists a filtration M 2 of M 1 through Ψ, such that M 2 = (F 2 , θ 2 ) and F 2 is an S4D-frame.
be the minimal filtration of M . The minimal filtration is well-known (cf. [5] or [12] 
and let R D2 be the pseudo-transitive closure of R
Note that the only difference between the pseudo-transitive and the transitive closure is that the irreflexive points remain irreflexive.
One can easily see that the reflexivity of R ′ is inherited by R 2 , and the reflexivity of R ′ follows from the reflexivity of R 1 . In the same way the symmetry of R D1 implies the symmetry of R D2 . The transitivity of R 2 and the pseudo-transitivity of R D2 are provided by construction. Next, we can easily show that
To complete the proof, we have to show that the relations R 2 and R D2 satisfy the definition of filtration. Since Filtration Lemma for the minimal filtration and its transitive closure in transitive logics are well-known (cf. [4] ), we will only check R D2 . So we obtain a filtration that reduces M 1 to a finite model over an S4D-frame. Proof. Assume that A is a formula such that A is not in L. Hence, A is refuted in some generated submodel M 1 = (W 1 , R 1 , R D1 , θ) of the canonical model of logic L. Note that since M 1 is a generated submodel, R D1 ∪ Id W1 is the universal relation.
Let Ψ be the set of all subformulas of formula A. By Lemma 5.3 there exists model M 2 = (F 2 , θ 2 ) such that F 2 is a S4D-frame and M 2 is a filtration of M 1 through Ψ.
Since M 2 is a filtration, A is refuted in M 2 . So it remains to prove (if needed) the T 1 -property and the DS-property for F 2 .
Let us prove that axiom AT 1 is valid in frame F 2 . By Lemma 4.11, it is sufficient to prove that for any η such that ¬ηR D2 η there does not exist ψ such that ψ = η and ψR 2 η.
Assume the contrary, i.e. there exists a point ψ = η such that ψR 2 η. Then consider their inverse images:
Since y ≈ Ψ x, we can take maximal l such that y l ≈ Ψ z l . By transitivity of ≈ Ψ we conclude that z l ≈ Ψ x and [
; which contradicts ¬ηR D2 η.
So y l = x & y l R 1 x(= z l ), at the same time reflexivity is preserved under filtration; hence ¬xR D1 x. So we came to a contradiction, because the generated subframe F 1 = (W 1 , R 1 , R D1 ) of the canonical model has the T 1 -property. Let us define analogue of p-morphism for maps from topological space onto finite S4D-frame. Definition 6.1. Let X be a topological space and let F = (W, R, R D ) be a finite Kripke frame. A function f : X → F is called a cd-p-morphism, if it is surjective and satisfies the following two conditions
Note that since f is surjective, (6.2) is equivalent to the following: if w is R Dirreflexive then f −1 (w) is one-element.
Lemma 6.2. If F is a finite Kripke frame, X is a topological space and f :
Proof. Note that f is cd − p−morphism and C distributes over finite 2 unions. So for U ⊆ W we have (6.3)
In other terms, f is an interior map between topological spaces X and T op(F ). Similarly (6.4)
Now let θ be an arbitrary valuation on the frame F . Take a valuation Θ on X such that Θ(p) = f −1 (θ(p)). Then a standard inductive argument shows that for any formula φ
where θ(φ) = {v |(F, θ), v |= φ } and Θ(φ) = {x |(X, Θ), x |= φ }. For this proof we rewrite all formulas using ♦ and = (rather then or [ =]). There are only two nontrivial cases:
, there exists a valuation θ such that θ(φ) = W . By (6.5) Θ(φ) = f −1 (θ(φ)), and so Θ(φ) = X since f is subjective. Thus φ ∈ L(X).
The following proposition uses ideas from [14, 6] 
Let us define the function f :
and the relation R ′ :
Let us prove that f is a p-morphism.
) and y ′ = (x, 1) (or vice verse); using (6.6) we conclude that
Case when f (x ′ ) = y is obvious so let f (x ′ ) = y. It means that y ∈ W 0 and x ′ = (y, i). So we put y ′ = (y, (i + 1) mod 2) and this will do.
Corollary 6.4. Let C be the class S4D-frames of the form F = (W, R, =) then S4D is complete with respect to C.
It is easy to show that for any S4D-frame F = (W, R, =) Proof. Let A be a formula that is not in S4D. Then by Corollary 6.4 there exists a Kripke frame F = (W, R, =) such that F |= A. By Lemma 6.5 we obtain T op(F ) |= A Proposition 6.7. Let F = (W, R, =) be a DS-frame, then T op(F ) is a dense-initself topological space.
Proof. In T op(F ) the least open neighborhood of point x is R(x). Since F is a DS-frame, R(x) − {x} = ∅; hence T op(F ) is dense-in-itself.
Theorem 6.8. S4DS is logic of all dense-in-itself topological spaces.
Proof. From Theorem 5.4 we know that S4DS is complete with respect to all finite DS-frames. Now we can apply Proposition 6.7 and Lemma 6.5.
If a logic contains the axiom (AT 1 ) then we cannot use the above methods. Indeed if F = (W, R, =) and F |= AT 1 , then R = Id W . The logic of such frames will be the logic of isolated points. So we need to find more sophisticated ways.
Recall a few definitions. On metric space can be defined natural topology based on open balls: {y | ρ(x, y) < r}.
Theorem 6.11. S4DT 1 S is compete with respect to any zero-dimensional densein-itself metric space.
Proof. Let X be a zero-dimensional dense-in-itself metric space and ρ is the distance in it; O(x, r) denotes the open ball {y ∈ X|ρ(x, y) < r).
We know from Theorem 5.4 that S4DT 1 S is complete with respect to all finite DS-T 1 -frames. If we prove that for an arbitrary finite DS-T 1 -frame F = (W, R, R D ), X cd −։ F then we prove the theorem.
We use induction on the size of F . Consider three cases. Case I. W = R(w 0 ), R D = W ×W for some w 0 . Since S4 is compete with respect to X(cf. [1] ) and F − = (W, R) is S4-frame, then there exists a continuous function
Since W is finite let us numerate all points in W starting with w 0 : W = {w 0 , w 1 , w 2 , . . . w n }. Any generated subframe F wi for i > 0 satisfies to case I. Take an arbitrary point x 0 and clopen sets Y 0 , Y 1 , . . . such that
for every n > 0. We can do it because X is zero-dimensional (cf. [13] )
and further we obtain
So, by induction, for any j > 0 there exists
Let us prove that f : X cd −։ F . First, we note that f is surjective. Second, we check (6.1). Assume that y ∈ X j then:
and the other way around:
y ∈ f −1 (R −1 (w)) =⇒ f Now assume that y = x 0 . For any w ∈ W , w 0 ∈ R −1 (w); hence
On the other hand, for some i, w = w i and for any open neighborhood of x 0 , there exists m such that (i − 1) ≡ m (mod n) and U ⊃ X m ⊃ f −1 m (w i ). In other words, x 0 is a limit point for f −1 (w i ), hence x 0 ∈ Cf −1 (w i ). Third, we check (6.2). Since f −1 (w 0 ) is a one-element set, (6.2) holds. Case III. Everything else. Let us take all R-minimal R-clusters of F and from each one of them we choose an arbitrary point. So we get the following set: {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v k }. Standard unravelling arguments show that
So we need to show that X cd −։ F ′ . Since F is a S4DT 1 S-frame, each F vi satisfies case I or case II. Since X is zero-dimensional, we can present X as disjunctive union of clopen subsets: X = X 1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ X k−1 ⊔ X k . By induction we have
It is easy to show that f = f 1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ f k (if x ∈ X i then f (x) = f i (x)) is a cd-p-morphism.
The immediate and obvious corollary of this theorem is that S4DT 1 S is complete with respect to all dense-in-itself T 1 spaces.
Conclusions and open problems.
The language with difference modality shows much more expressive power then basic topological language, and even more then basic language with universal modality. We can express density-in-itself, T 1 , and connectedness in it. Moreover the axiom
differs R from R 2 (cf. [7] ). It was proved that logic S4DT 1 S+(AE 1 )+"connectedness" is complete with respect to R n , n ≥ 2 (the full proof is to be published). We still do not know the D-logic of R and whether S4D + (AT 1 ) is complete with respect to all T 1 spaces.
